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On Julian Jaynes and the Origins of Consciousness: A Modern Look

Note: This essay is a reflection on the ideas of Julian Jaynes and his remarkable 1976 book The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. Jaynes’ theory—that human beings once experienced divine voices guiding their actions before the emergence of modern introspective consciousness—remains controversial and widely debated. The purpose of this essay is not to prove or disprove Jaynes’ neurological model but to explore the enduring power of the questions he raised.

In particular, I am interested in two aspects of Jaynes’ work that remain deeply suggestive: his interpretation of early literature such as the Iliad, where modern psychological interiority appears strangely absent, and his observations about how mobility—travelers, shepherds, merchants, and wanderers moving between cultures—may have destabilized older systems of divine authority. These figures, operating in uncertain cultural terrain, may have been among the first people forced into the improvisational reasoning that resembles modern consciousness.

The essay also touches on institutions like the Oracle of Delphi and on the persistence of voice phenomena in modern contexts, ranging from hypnagogic states and exhaustion to more troubling historical cases such as the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy by Sirhan Sirhan. These examples are not presented as proof of Jaynes’ theory but as reminders that the boundary between internal thought and perceived external command may be more complex than we sometimes assume.

Finally, the brief personal anecdote involving an MRI scan is included not as evidence but as illustration: a small modern echo of the ambiguous mental territory Jaynes explored. Moments in which voices seem to arise from somewhere between the inner and outer mind remain part of human experience.

Whether Jaynes was ultimately correct in his sweeping historical claims is still an open question. But his work continues to provoke a fascinating possibility: that consciousness itself has a history, and that the modern reflective self emerged gradually out of older forms of human experience.

If nothing else, Jaynes reminds us that the human mind is not a finished structure. It is something still unfolding—shaped by culture, language, movement, and time.

“She keeps coming closer saying I can feel it in my bones
Schizophrenia is taking me home.”
— Sonic Youth

There are certain books that never quite disappear. They do not settle comfortably into the academic canon, nor are they fully dismissed. They linger. They circulate quietly among curious readers, occasionally resurfacing in conversation decades after publication, as if waiting for another generation to discover them.

One such book is The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.

Its author, Julian Jaynes, was a psychologist who spent much of his career outside the central institutions of modern neuroscience. When the book appeared in 1976 it created an immediate sensation. Reviewers alternately described it as brilliant, bizarre, visionary, or simply impossible. The theory it proposed was breathtaking in scope. Jaynes suggested that the subjective, introspective consciousness modern people take for granted—the inner sense of “I,” the reflective voice narrating our own thoughts—was not an ancient human constant. It had emerged, he argued, only a few thousand years ago.

According to Jaynes, the minds of early civilizations functioned differently. People did not experience themselves as the authors of their own decisions. Instead they heard the voices of gods.

Not metaphorically. Literally.

Commands issued in auditory form—voices that appeared to come from outside the self—guided action. These voices, Jaynes argued, were generated by one hemisphere of the brain and experienced by the other as divine instruction. He called this earlier mentality the bicameral mind.

The theory has never been accepted in its full neurological form. Archaeologists, classicists, and neuroscientists have raised serious objections. And yet the book continues to circulate, discussed by philosophers, psychologists, historians of religion, and the occasional curious reader who stumbles across it in a used bookstore or late-night internet search.

Why?

Part of the answer is simple: Jaynes was asking a question that remains deeply unsettling.

What if human consciousness has a history?

What if the inner voice we experience as our own—our private mental narrator—was not always there?

I first encountered Jaynes sometime around 2012 or 2013, during a period when I was reading deeply in the work of Carl Jung and writing a small series of reflections that I called Jungian Intimations. Like many readers drawn to Jung, I was interested in symbolism, archetypes, and the strange persistence of mythic imagery in the modern psyche. I briefly considered enrolling in an online course with the Jungian analyst Michael Conforti, though in the end I took a class from his wife, Nancy Qualls-Corbett, on Jung and visual art. Around that time I read the slim but remarkable volume Jung on Art, which argues that artistic creation often emerges when archetypal material pushes through the individual psyche into symbolic form.

Jaynes appeared in my reading not long afterward. At first glance he seemed to be asking a related but far more radical question. Jung had treated mythic figures as symbolic expressions of the psyche. Jaynes suggested that the gods of ancient literature might once have been experienced as genuine voices—psychological events interpreted as divine command.

Whether or not one ultimately accepts his neurological model, Jaynes assembled a body of evidence that continues to provoke thought. In particular, he pointed to a striking feature of early literature. Characters in ancient texts often act without the kind of introspective self-reflection modern readers expect. Decisions appear suddenly, attributed not to inner deliberation but to divine intervention.

Nowhere is this more visible than in the world of the Iliad. When Achilles restrains himself from killing Agamemnon, it is not because he pauses to analyze his emotions. Athena appears beside him and tells him what to do. The boundary between divine command and human action is porous.

Jaynes argued that such passages were not merely literary conventions but traces of an earlier mentality.

Yet perhaps the most fascinating part of his theory lies elsewhere—in the margins of ancient societies, among the people least anchored to a single cultural world.

The wanderers.

Ancient civilizations were more mobile than we sometimes imagine. Even in the Bronze Age there were shepherds drifting across borderlands, merchants following caravan routes between cities, sailors moving from port to port across the Mediterranean and Near East. These figures lived at the edges of cultural systems that otherwise depended on stability and hierarchy.

For Jaynes, such wanderers may have played an unexpected role in the transformation of the human mind.

The bicameral system, as he described it, functioned best within tightly structured societies. Authority flowed downward through clear hierarchies: gods to kings, kings to priests, priests to ordinary people. Ritual, language, and shared myth reinforced the system. The divine voices guiding behavior were embedded within a familiar cultural environment.

But travelers moved beyond those environments.

A shepherd leaving his village might cross into territory where different gods were worshipped. A merchant arriving in a foreign city encountered unfamiliar laws, languages, and customs. A sailor might spend months among people whose rituals and social expectations bore little resemblance to those of home.

In such situations the guiding voices of one’s own culture could become unreliable.

If a divine command urged action in a place where the surrounding society operated under entirely different assumptions, the voice might cease to function as a stable guide. The traveler found himself in a new psychological situation—cut loose from the authority structures that had previously organized experience.

This was not a comfortable position.

To survive, wanderers had to develop different skills. They had to negotiate, observe, and interpret. They had to learn foreign languages and read unfamiliar social signals. They had to improvise.

In other words, they had to think.

Jaynes speculated that these mobile figures—shepherds, traders, sailors—may have been among the first people forced into something like modern reflective consciousness. The birthplaces of that consciousness may not have been temples or palaces but the messy contact zones of ancient trade: caravan routes crossing deserts, harbor towns where languages mingled, frontier markets where strangers bargained with one another under uncertain rules.

If the bicameral system required cultural enclosure to function, then mobility threatened its stability.

And the ancient world was becoming increasingly mobile.

Even as this transformation unfolded, remnants of the earlier mentality persisted in institutional form.

One of the most famous examples was the Oracle of Delphi. For centuries Greek leaders traveled to Delphi seeking divine guidance on matters of war, colonization, and political decision-making. The oracle’s pronouncements—often delivered in trance-like states by the Pythia—were treated as authoritative messages from the god Apollo.

From a Jaynesian perspective, institutions like Delphi may represent cultural technologies designed to preserve the authority of divine voices even as the underlying psychological system weakened. Kings and city-states continued to seek guidance from gods because the tradition of divine command remained embedded in social life.

Gradually, however, new forms of decision-making emerged.

Written law codes appeared. Philosophical reflection developed. Greek drama explored the tensions between divine authority and human responsibility. The shift was not sudden or uniform, but over time a new psychological landscape became visible—one in which individuals increasingly experienced themselves as authors of their own thoughts.

This transition was not simply intellectual. It may have been neurological, cultural, linguistic, and historical all at once.

Jaynes placed the decisive phase of the transformation during the turmoil of the late Bronze Age collapse, roughly between 1200 and 800 BCE—a period when many ancient societies experienced widespread disruption. Cities were destroyed, trade networks collapsed, and populations migrated. In the midst of this upheaval, older forms of authority may have faltered, forcing new modes of self-organization to emerge.

Whether or not Jaynes correctly identified the precise mechanism, he was surely right about one thing: consciousness as we experience it today may not be a timeless given.

It may be an achievement—fragile, historically contingent, and still evolving.

Yet if the bicameral mind truly vanished, one might expect the phenomenon of hearing commanding voices to disappear entirely from modern experience.

It has not.

Under certain conditions, people still report experiences remarkably similar to those Jaynes described. In states of extreme exhaustion, during moments of sensory deprivation, or in the liminal territory between waking and sleep, voices sometimes appear that are difficult to classify as either internal or external.

I had an experience of this kind several years ago while undergoing an MRI scan in a hospital.

Anyone who has had an MRI knows the strange psychological environment it creates. You lie alone inside a narrow tube, immobilized, while the machine produces a sequence of loud mechanical pulses and vibrations. The noise is rhythmic and relentless. There is little sensory input beyond the sound and the awareness of one’s own breathing.

Somewhere in the midst of that experience, a voice appeared.

It was not loud or dramatic. It was simply there—a calm male voice with the unmistakable tone of a father speaking to a child. The message itself was simple, almost reassuring. But what struck me most was the ambiguity of the experience. The voice did not feel exactly like a thought, yet it did not feel entirely external either. It occupied a strange borderland between inner and outer perception.

The moment passed quickly, but the memory lingered.

Experiences of this sort are not uncommon. Psychologists studying hypnagogic states—the transitional zone between waking and sleep—have documented similar phenomena. Auditory hallucinations appear in certain psychiatric conditions, most famously schizophrenia. Hypnotic suggestion can also produce experiences in which subjects perceive commands or messages that seem to originate outside their conscious control.

Jaynes believed such phenomena represented vestiges of the older bicameral mentality.

The voices of the gods, in his view, had not entirely vanished. They had simply retreated to the margins of modern consciousness.

Occasionally these phenomena intersect with darker episodes of modern history.

The assassination of Robert F. Kennedy by Sirhan Sirhan remains one of the most disturbing cases often discussed in connection with hypnosis and altered states of consciousness. Some researchers have argued that Sirhan may have been unusually susceptible to hypnotic suggestion, raising unsettling questions about the relationship between external influence and voluntary action.

It would be irresponsible to claim that Jaynes’ theory explains such events. Human behavior is far too complex for any single model to capture fully. Yet cases like Sirhan’s remind us that the boundary between autonomous decision and externally shaped impulse is not always as clear as modern assumptions suggest.

The mind remains a mysterious territory.

Half a century after its publication, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind continues to provoke debate not because it solved the problem of consciousness but because it reframed it. Jaynes forced readers to confront the possibility that the human mind has undergone profound historical transformations.

Even if the details of his neurological model prove incorrect, the broader insight may endure. Literature, religion, and psychology all suggest that the experience of selfhood has changed over time. The ancient world did not necessarily perceive the mind in the same way we do.

Something was gained in the transition to modern consciousness.

We gained introspection, philosophical reflection, and the capacity to examine our own motives. We gained the intellectual freedom that made science, democracy, and modern literature possible.

But something may also have been lost.

In the world Jaynes described, human beings lived in a landscape animated by voices of divine authority. Decisions arrived not through anxious deliberation but through commands experienced as sacred guidance. That world may have been more constrained, but it may also have felt more certain.

Modern consciousness offers freedom, but it also brings doubt and solitude. The voices of the gods have largely fallen silent, replaced by the quieter and often less confident voice we call our own.

Perhaps the most we can say is that consciousness, like culture itself, continues to evolve. The wanderers of ancient caravan routes helped shape the first emergence of reflective thought. Today we inhabit a global world of constant movement, translation, and negotiation—a world not entirely unlike those early contact zones where cultures once collided.

We are all wanderers now.

And somewhere, perhaps, the faint echoes of older voices still remain.

Dedication:

For dreamers and wanderers everywhere.

Note: If you enjoyed this piece, you might also like the pieces below, which take up somewhat similar themes.

On Coming Through
Carl Jung’s Collected Works: I
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Are There Aliens In Our Oceans? An Objective Investigation

Note: This essay is written in the spirit of amused inquiry rather than firm conclusion. Human history is filled with reports of strange visions, unexplained lights, divine visitations, and unidentified aerial phenomena. The interpretation of such experiences has tended to shift with the cultural vocabulary of the time. Medieval Europeans often described encounters with saints or angels. In the twentieth century the language of extraterrestrials became available.

The psychologist Carl Jung famously suggested that UFO sightings may function partly as modern mythologies—symbolic attempts by societies to understand mysterious experiences in technological terms. Jung also observed, with characteristic dry humor, that UFOs often appear to be “somehow not photogenic.”

The present investigation was prompted by my brother Mike, who recently asserted via text message that extraterrestrials are currently residing in Earth’s oceans. His wife Coleen agreed. “They are everywhere,” she said. While this claim remains unverified, the oceans themselves are vast, poorly explored, and capable of sustaining a wide range of speculative hypotheses.

The purpose of the essay is therefore not to prove or disprove the existence of extraterrestrial life in the ocean. Rather, it is to examine why such ideas persist, how they resemble earlier historical visions—from medieval religious phenomena to modern UFO culture—and why the possibility continues to feel strangely plausible to otherwise reasonable adults.

Epigraph

There are aliens in our midst.

Wussy

The Jung Problem

At this point in the investigation one is reminded of a dry observation by the Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung.

Jung noted that UFOs possess a curious property: they are “somehow not photogenic.” Sightings multiply, witnesses speak with conviction, yet the documentation remains just slightly blurry.

Jung’s larger argument was that such phenomena often behave like modern myths. They appear at moments when societies are under stress, technological change is accelerating, and people are searching for new symbolic explanations of the world.

In other words, the sky fills with things.

Medieval Precedents

This pattern is not entirely new.

During certain periods of medieval Europe, particularly when grain supplies were contaminated by the fungus ergot, communities reported vivid religious visions: glowing figures in the sky, saints appearing in fields, the Virgin Mary materializing in unexpected places.

Ergot poisoning, now understood scientifically, can produce powerful hallucinations. But to the people experiencing them the visions were not chemical side effects. They were divine manifestations.

Entire crowds could witness miraculous shapes in the heavens or detect holy images in the crust of bread. A modern observer might diagnose environmental intoxication or collective suggestion. The participants experienced revelation.

The important point is that the content of the vision reflected the cultural vocabulary available at the time.

Medieval Europe saw saints. Modern America sees aliens.

One can see this dynamic clearly in the case of Joan of Arc. Joan reported hearing voices and receiving instructions from heavenly figures whom she identified as saints.

Historians generally accept that Joan sincerely believed these visions were divine communications.

But it is difficult not to notice that saints were the most advanced category of non-human intelligence available in fifteenth-century France. The conceptual vocabulary for extraterrestrials would not be invented for several hundred years.

Had Joan lived in the late twentieth century, it is at least possible that the same experience might have been interpreted somewhat differently.

She might have reported a craft.

The Cold War Sky

By the late 1940s the heavens had acquired a new cast of characters.

The famous incident near Roswell occurred in 1947, just as the Cold War was beginning to reorganize the world’s imagination. Reports of flying saucers multiplied. The mysterious visitors were described with increasing consistency: small grey beings with large heads and enormous eyes.

The explanation most often offered by the authorities was considerably less glamorous.

Weather balloons.

Strange objects falling from the sky during the early Cold War often turned out to be classified surveillance equipment. Unfortunately, the phrase “weather balloon” never fully satisfied the public imagination.

Aliens, after all, are much more interesting than meteorology.

The Mulder Doctrine

By the 1990s the entire mythology had been carefully systematized by American television.

The X-Files:

In the series, FBI agent Fox Mulder dedicates his career to investigating extraterrestrial activity after his sister Samantha is abducted from their home during childhood.

The abduction occurs at night. A strange light fills the room. The sister disappears.

Mulder spends the rest of his life attempting to prove that what he witnessed was real.

His partner, Dana Scully, is assigned to bring scientific skepticism to the enterprise. Their relationship gradually becomes one of the most beloved partnerships in television history, built on the productive tension between belief and doubt.

Entire generations of viewers absorbed the idea that somewhere in the sky—or possibly beneath the ocean—extraterrestrial activity might be quietly unfolding.

A Modern Lens

Seen from a slightly greater distance, the pattern begins to look familiar.

Medieval villagers saw saints because saints were the explanatory language available to them. Cold War Americans saw aliens because aliens had become the new vocabulary of the unknown.

Both phenomena may reflect the same basic human impulse: when confronted with mysterious experiences, we populate the heavens with the most compelling figures our culture provides.

Which brings us back to Mike.

So Are There Aliens In Our Oceans?

It must be admitted that if an advanced civilization from another planet wished to observe humanity without attracting attention, the deep ocean would offer several practical advantages. The environment is dark, difficult to access, and rarely visited by surface-dwelling primates equipped with submarines that can only remain operational for limited periods of time.

From a strategic standpoint, it would be an excellent hiding place.

This possibility has occurred to more than one observer, including my friend Mason, who recently suggested that a technologically sophisticated off-world civilization might simply have decided that the bottom of the ocean was the most convenient place to avoid the rest of us.

Provisional Conclusions

My brother Mike believes there are aliens in the ocean.

Carl Jung might have suggested that mysterious phenomena often adopt the symbolic clothing of their era. The Middle Ages had saints. The twentieth century produced extraterrestrials.

Mike has simply moved the story offshore.

The oceans remain vast and poorly explored. The woods remain dark and occasionally unsettling at night. Both environments have the correct atmospheric conditions for unexpected encounters.

If extraterrestrials are present, they may well prefer the sea.

But it would be a mistake to rule out the woods.

In either case, it seems wise to remain polite.

Footnote: The Ocean Logic

It must be admitted that if extraterrestrials wished to establish a long-term observational presence on Earth, the ocean would offer several advantages. Humans rarely visit the deep sea, and when we do we tend to leave fairly quickly due to crushing pressure, darkness, and the general inconvenience of breathing water.

From the perspective of an advanced extraterrestrial civilization attempting to avoid unnecessary interaction with our species, the ocean may therefore represent the single most sensible real estate on the planet.

Mike may, in other words, be thinking strategically.

POSTSCRIPT: Supplemental Testimony

Shortly after the investigation began, the primary witness—my brother Mike—provided additional clarification regarding his position.

According to Mike, extraterrestrial life has not only visited Earth’s oceans but has been present there for a considerable period of time. The aliens, he explained, appear to prefer the environment and have constructed bases beneath the sea.

When asked for supporting evidence, Mike cited the well-known Navy pilot videos showing unidentified aerial objects performing unusual maneuvers.

These videos—often referred to as the “Tic Tac” incidents—have circulated widely in recent years and are frequently interpreted as evidence of advanced technology of unknown origin.

Mike considers them decisive.

A second observer, his wife Colleen, agreed with this general assessment while expanding the hypothesis somewhat.

In her view, extraterrestrials may not be confined to the ocean at all. Rather, they may be present around us at all times.

According to Colleen, it is entirely possible that aliens walk among us.

At this stage of the investigation, these claims remain under review.

Dedication: For my brother Mike. I love you bro, but I still thinks them shits are in the woods.

Note: If you liked this piece, you may also like the pieces below, which also discuss the famous psychologist Carl Jung.

Carl Jung’s Collected Works: I
Jungian Intimations: I
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On The Dubious Anna Delvey

Note: This essay reflects on the curious cultural figure of Anna Delvey, whose rise and fall in the New York art and social scene became one of the stranger morality plays of the late 2010s. Delvey—born Anna Sorokin in Russia—gained notoriety for presenting herself as a wealthy European heiress while attempting to secure loans and social capital for an ambitious but largely imaginary cultural venture known as the Anna Delvey Foundation.

The events described here draw on widely reported elements of the case: Delvey’s years moving through luxury hotels in Manhattan, her efforts to obtain financing for a private art and social club, the unraveling of her financial claims, and the now-famous trip to Dubai in which a friend—later a magazine writer documenting the experience—was left responsible for an enormous hotel bill after promised funds failed to appear.

The piece does not attempt investigative reporting. Instead, it approaches the story in a spirit of cultural anthropology. Cities like New York have always attracted individuals engaged in various forms of self-invention. The line between ambition, performance, exaggeration, and outright fraud can sometimes appear only after events have run their course. Delvey’s story is compelling partly because it dramatizes this thin boundary in unusually vivid form.

If the tone here sometimes drifts toward sympathy rather than condemnation, that is intentional. Many urban cultural scenes—especially art worlds—operate on the energy of strivers who are, in one way or another, attempting to become something slightly larger than their present circumstances allow. Most of them eventually succeed or quietly disappear. A very small number, like Delvey, collapse in public.

Their stories reveal something not only about themselves, but about the environments that briefly believed in them.

Epigraph

“For all the crazy people who can never get it right.”
— Drugstore

I. The Entrance

There is a certain kind of person who arrives in a city not merely to live there but to declare themselves into existence. Cities like New York attract them the way bright lights attract moths. They arrive with luggage, ideas, clothes that signal belonging, and an almost reckless confidence that the future will eventually arrange itself around their intentions.

Anna Delvey was one of these people.

When she appeared in the New York art scene, she seemed to possess the basic ingredients required for entry into that peculiar ecosystem: style, confidence, and an air of European mystery. She wore expensive-looking dresses and shoes. She wore aa lot of make up and had her hair done at expensive salons. She seemed for a while to ooze money. She spoke casually about ambitious cultural projects. She moved through hotels and restaurants as if she had always belonged to that world. In New York, that is often enough.

The city runs on confidence performances. Every ambitious young person who arrives there is, in some sense, performing the life they intend to have. The art world especially is full of people who are not yet what they claim to be but are working very hard to become it.

Delvey fit into that theater perfectly.

II. The Vision

The striking thing about Delvey was that she didn’t simply want to attend the art scene. She wanted to build something inside it. Her idea was the Anna Delvey Foundation: a kind of private cultural club and exhibition space in downtown Manhattan. It would combine gallery spaces, social rooms, events, artists, patrons, and the atmosphere of a private cultural salon. A place where the city’s creative and wealthy classes might gather.

The plan was grand. But it also had a strange plausibility. New York is full of institutions that began with the ambition of a single person who simply decided that something should exist and then spent years convincing others to believe in it.

Delvey spoke about the project with total conviction. She behaved like someone who already possessed the financial backing required to make such a thing happen. And because she behaved that way, many people assumed the money must exist somewhere.

This is one of the basic mechanics of social confidence. If someone carries themselves like a person whose financial arrangements have already been verified by someone else, most people will not ask too many questions.

III. Hotels

Hotels played a central role in the Delvey story.

Luxury hotels are perfect environments for people living inside ambitious performances. They operate on the assumption that their guests are legitimate. The bill will eventually be settled. The credit line exists somewhere. The guest’s presence itself is treated as evidence of solvency.

Delvey floated through some of New York’s most expensive hotels as if she were simply another wealthy European visitor temporarily residing there while arranging various cultural affairs. The lobbies, the restaurants, the rooms—all of it provided a stage set that reinforced the story she was telling.

Hotels also create a particular social atmosphere. Everyone is temporarily suspended between identities. People are traveling, negotiating, arriving, leaving. It is a place where someone can exist slightly outside the ordinary structures of verification.

For a while, the performance worked.

IV. The Father

Like many figures who construct elaborate new identities, Delvey carried with her a somewhat murky origin story.

She spoke of family wealth. Of connections. Of a background that seemed to hover somewhere between Russia and Germany, between modest beginnings and more glamorous narratives.

Her real childhood was more ambiguous. Her father had worked as a truck driver and later operated a heating and cooling business. It was a respectable, ordinary life. But it did not contain the European aristocratic wealth that sometimes appeared in Delvey’s stories.

This kind of ambiguity is not unusual among people attempting radical self-invention. The past becomes something flexible, something that can be rearranged slightly in order to support the person one intends to become.

In cities like New York, such reinvention is practically a tradition.

V. Dubai

The most extraordinary episode in the Delvey saga took place far from Manhattan, on a trip to Dubai. Delvey traveled there with a friend—a magazine writer who was documenting the glamorous world that Delvey seemed to inhabit. The trip was meant to be luxurious: private villas, elaborate dinners, the kind of extravagant travel that confirms a person’s social status.

For a few days everything unfolded according to the script. And then the bill arrived. The charges for the trip reached roughly $60,000. Delvey’s payment arrangements suddenly failed. The promised wire transfers did not appear. The hotel demanded settlement.

And the friend—the magazine writer who had been invited along for the ride—found herself responsible for the enormous bill. So Delvey left her there. Super bad business Anna baby.

It was a moment that perfectly captured the strange mechanics of confidence artistry. The performance works right up until the moment when reality insists on payment.

Someone, eventually, must pay the bill.

VI. Collapse

Once the financial machinery began to fail, the unraveling accelerated. Banks wanted documentation. Hotels wanted payment. Institutions that had briefly entertained the idea of supporting Delvey’s foundation began to ask more detailed questions about the supposed trust fund that would finance it.

The answers did not exist. The performance collapsed. Delvey was eventually arrested, tried, and convicted of fraud.

VII. The Strange Sympathy

And yet the Delvey story produced a strangely sympathetic public response. Perhaps it was because she had not simply been extracting money for luxury purchases. She had been trying, in her own improbable way, to create something. A cultural institution. A social space. A downtown hub for art and ambition.

The plan was impossible, but the ambition was recognizable. Many people—especially those drawn to cities like New York—understand the impulse to reinvent oneself, to construct a future through sheer force of belief. Delvey simply pushed that impulse far beyond the point where the arithmetic could sustain it.

VIII. Coda

In the end, the most interesting thing about Anna Delvey may not be that she fooled people. New York has always been full of people attempting improbable social performances. The interesting thing is that, for a moment, she came very close to building the life she imagined. And perhaps that is why stories like hers continue to fascinate us. They remind us that the line between visionary and impostor is often visible only in hindsight.

Dedication: For Anna baby (you’re hot BTW) and all the beautiful strivers out there. May your world-curated art spaces someday come true.

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On George Santos (aka The Fabulous Kitara)

Note: This piece uses the figure of George Santos as a kind of cultural parable. The story of Santos—his improbable congressional run on Long Island, the famous unraveling of his résumé (including the legendary and totally outta control Baruch volleyball claim), the rapid collapse of political support from fellow New York Republicans, his eventual expulsion from Congress, and his strange second act as a Cameo celebrity—forms one of the more surreal public morality plays of recent American politics.

The apartment story that frames the essay is not meant as a literal equivalence. Kitara is not Santos, and roommates are not members of Congress. The comparison operates at the level of archetype: the charismatic figure who arrives full of sunshine, quickly becomes central to a small social world, and then—through one small but revealing detail—forces everyone around them to confront the uneasy coexistence of charm and opportunism.

The name “Kitara,” Santos’ drag name from back in Brazil where he if from (Santos is gay of course) is used here in the spirit of narrative shorthand rather than biography. Anyone who has lived with roommates long enough will recognize the basic situation. Shared apartments are small republics built on trust, improvisation, and the quiet hope that everyone involved is playing roughly the same game. Most of the time that hope is justified. Occasionally it is not.

If the tone of the piece drifts toward amusement, and even affection, rather than outrage, that is deliberate. Characters like Santos—and the occasional fabulous roommate—have a peculiar ability to provoke both exasperation and reluctant admiration. The performance can be infuriating. But it can also be oddly entertaining.

Such people rarely disappear completely. They simply move on to the next stage. Sometimes that stage is Congress. Sometimes it is Cameo (get that scratch Georgie baby!). And sometimes it is just the memory of a roommate who once seemed almost too good to be true.

Epigraph

“People seldom do what they believe in.
They just do what is convenient, then repent.”
— Bob Dylan

I. The Fabulous Roommate

Every apartment has its mythology.

The quiet one who never emerges from his room except to microwave things at strange hours. The earnest one who tries to establish chore charts that everyone pretends to follow for about ten days. The one who adopts pets with a confidence that suggests the rest of the household has already agreed to care for them.

And then, once in a while, there is the fabulous roommate. Kitara was that roommate.

She arrived with the sort of personality that immediately rearranges the emotional furniture of a place. Cheerful without being cloying. Social without being exhausting. Organized without being smug about it. She seemed to understand, instinctively, the delicate social contract of shared living: when to chat, when to disappear, when to clean something quietly so no one felt guilty.

Visitors loved her. Friends who came by would inevitably say some version of the same thing: “Your roommate is amazing.”

And she was. At least at first.

She was the sort of person who made the apartment feel like a small, cheerful republic. There were occasional dinners, occasional drinks, occasional pets that appeared temporarily in the orbit of the household. Nothing dramatic. Just the easy, slightly improvised domestic life that happens when a handful of semi-adults share a roof and try to keep the machinery of living running smoothly.

There are people who move through life like that—people who bring lightness with them. People who make small environments work better simply by being present. You think, when you meet someone like this: what a lucky break.

II. The Sunshine Personality

There is another category of person, however, that resembles the fabulous roommate from a distance. These people also arrive with sunshine. They are charming. They are energetic. They seem to know how to move through rooms with effortless confidence. They shake hands warmly. They remember names. They tell stories. They radiate the sort of friendliness that makes everyone feel briefly like a co-conspirator in something cheerful.

The difference is subtle, and it often takes time to notice. These are not merely charming people.

These are the performers. And, one of the most remarkable recent examples of this type in American public life was George Santos.

Santos appeared, seemingly out of nowhere, in the political ecosystem of Long Island. His run for Congress was, at least initially, improbable in the way that many modern political stories can be. The district had long been competitive, but his rise through the local Republican apparatus was unusually smooth. There was little serious opposition within the party. The campaign itself unfolded with the sort of confident momentum that often accompanies candidates who seem, at least on paper, to possess a compelling life story.

And what a life story it was.

Santos presented himself as the son of immigrants who had risen through the financial world, a man with an impressive résumé and a philanthropic sensibility. He spoke of professional success, cultural fluency, and various achievements that painted a portrait of upward mobility and cosmopolitan competence.

The voters of Long Island sent him to Congress. And then, almost immediately, the details began to unravel.

III. The Volleyball Player

The first cracks appeared through the ordinary mechanism of local journalism. Reporters from Long Island newspapers began to do what reporters traditionally do: verify things.

The résumé turned out to be an imaginative document. The professional history did not quite match reality. The educational claims were questionable. Various details that had seemed impressive during the campaign began to dissolve under scrutiny.

One of the most memorable revelations involved an oddly specific athletic claim. Santos had described himself as a standout volleyball player during his time at Baruch College. Not merely a participant, but something close to a star—someone whose record-setting performance had been part of his biography.

There was just one problem. Baruch College had no record of him playing volleyball. None at all. Outta control. The story collapsed on that small detail. It is often the small details that do that.

A résumé can contain many large claims, and those claims can hover in a kind of vague plausibility for a surprisingly long time. But one precise, checkable fact—the volleyball team roster, the game statistics, the athletic department archives—can puncture an entire narrative.

The reporters pulled the thread and the sweater unraveled.

IV. The Grifter Archetype

Once the unraveling began, it accelerated. Claims about employment at major financial firms proved dubious. Educational credentials evaporated. Personal history mutated in various directions depending on which previous statement one examined.

Soon the story had migrated from the political pages into the broader theater of American spectacle. Late-night comedians noticed. Cable news panels convened. Social media filled with the strange, almost baroque details of the saga. Members of his own party began to distance themselves.

Several Republican members of the New York congressional delegation—figures who had initially welcomed a new colleague—publicly called for him to resign as the scope of the fabrications became clear. The situation became untenable. The House of Representatives eventually voted to expel him, a rare and historically notable step.

It was a dramatic fall.

And yet even during the collapse, Santos retained something remarkable.

Charm.

He gave interviews. He sparred with reporters. He adopted, at times, an almost mischievous tone about the entire affair. There was a faint air of theatricality to the proceedings, as though the story had become a kind of performance art about the boundaries of credibility.

The grifter archetype has a peculiar resilience. Even when the illusion collapses, the performer often remains oddly entertaining.

V. The Apartment

Watching the Santos saga unfold, I found myself thinking more about Kitara.

Because the thing about grifters is not simply that they deceive.

It is that they charm.

They charm their way into rooms, into institutions, into social networks. They radiate warmth. They build small communities of goodwill around themselves. And for quite a while, everything feels perfectly normal.

Until one day something small happens. Something missing.

In the apartment it was GM’s silver. Not a vast treasure. Not an heirloom of historic significance. Just a small, familiar object that lived in a particular drawer and had always lived there.

One morning it was gone. The initial reaction in situations like this is always practical. Maybe you moved it. Maybe it fell behind something. Maybe someone borrowed it.

The mind runs through a series of benign explanations, each one slightly less convincing than the last.

And then a thought appears.

Quietly.

Oh shit.

VI. The Knowledge You Don’t Want

Roommate life operates on a fragile form of trust.

You share space. You share kitchens. Sometimes you share pets, groceries, furniture, phone bills, music, stories. The arrangement functions because everyone tacitly agrees not to test the boundaries of that trust too aggressively.

When something disappears, the entire structure trembles.

But there is another complication.

Sometimes you realize what probably happened. And you also realize that confirming it would destroy the social equilibrium of the apartment.

So you do a strange psychological maneuver.

You know. But you decide not to know.

Life continues.

The dishes are washed. Conversations occur. The roommate remains charming. The apartment continues to function as a small republic of semi-functional adults.

But a hairline crack now runs through the arrangement.

VII. The Fall

For Santos the crack widened into a canyon.

The congressional investigation intensified. Ethical questions multiplied. Party support evaporated. Eventually the House voted to expel him, ending one of the most surreal political tenures in recent memory.

Yet even after the fall, Santos demonstrated a familiar trait of the charismatic grifter.

He adapted. He appeared on podcasts. He commented on political scandals involving others. He expressed a certain moral indignation about the ethical lapses of fellow politicians—including members of his own party—sometimes with a tone that was almost hilariously sanctimonious given the circumstances.

The performer remained on stage. And then came the truly modern twist.

Santos joined Cameo. And he’s fucking great on it!

For a fee, he would record personalized video messages: birthday greetings, congratulations, small performances of his peculiar brand of post-scandal celebrity.

The internet, as it often does, embraced the absurdity.

VIII. The Cameo

At some point I watched a few of his videos.

There he was, smiling warmly into the camera, delivering a cheerful greeting to a stranger somewhere in America. The tone was friendly, relaxed, slightly mischievous.

And I laughed.

Because the performance was genuinely funny. The charm, infuriatingly, still worked. It reminded me of the old fable about the scorpion and the frog.

The scorpion asks for a ride across the river. The frog hesitates, noting that scorpions have a reputation for stinging frogs. The scorpion assures him that such a thing would be irrational; if he stung the frog mid-crossing, both of them would drown.

The frog agrees.

Halfway across the river the scorpion stings him.

“Why?” the frog asks as they sink.

“I can’t help it,” the scorpion replies. “It’s my nature.”

The scorpion cannot help himself.

But every now and then the scorpion also sends someone a birthday message on Cameo, smiling warmly and wishing them a fantastic year ahead.

And you find yourself laughing anyway.

The truth about characters like Santos—and perhaps about certain roommates—is that their charm is not an illusion.

It’s real.

The trouble is that it coexists quite comfortably with everything else.

Dedication:

For Kitara. May you make a fucking mint on Cameo and look totally gorgeous while doing it.

Note: If you enjoyed this story, you might also enjoy these other pieces about American grifters.

On The Dubious Anna Delvey
On Comebacks and Failed Comebacks V: Rod Blagojevich
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On the Song “Encounter at 3 AM”

Note: This piece sits at the intersection of music, memory, and atmosphere rather than narrative disclosure. It reflects on a late-night encounter whose emotional resonance exceeded its visible duration, while respecting the privacy of the people involved and the ambiguity that gives such moments their meaning.

The essay is less about what happened than about how certain hours alter perception — the thin, liminal spaces where experience feels lightly refracted and ordinary interaction carries unexpected depth. References to artists like Franz Wright, Clem Snide, and Steve Earle, function as interpretive companions rather than explanatory frameworks, illustrating how art often provides language for encounters that resist direct narration.

If the piece feels intentionally incomplete, that is by design. Some experiences are best preserved as atmospheres rather than stories — moments acknowledged without being fully claimed, interpreted without being resolved.

In that sense, this essay is not an account but a calibration: a quiet recognition that certain hours open briefly, rearrange something internal, and then close without explanation.

And that noticing, in itself, is enough.

A brief reflection on songs, hauntings, and the thin hour of the night

Epigraph
“All I wanted was a little money / All I needed was a week or two…”
— Steve Earle, What’s a Simple Man to Do? (2002)

I first learned the shape of this feeling not through Steve Earle, but through Clem Snide’s cover of Franz Wright — an artistic relay in which one voice carries another’s encounter across distance and time, transforming the original into something that feels simultaneously intimate and secondhand. That is often how hauntings arrive for me: sidelong, refracted, mediated by art before experience recognizes itself inside the echo.

A borrowed door into an original room.

And that is where the hour begins.

There exists a space late at night — or early in the morning, depending on temperament and life stage — when cognition thins and the world grows slightly porous. The clock reads 3 AM, but the number matters less than the condition: the hour when ordinary structures loosen their grip, when language quiets, when identity becomes less declarative and more receptive.

At that hour, the city changes character.

Sound carries differently.
Light softens into suggestion.
Distance feels compressed.
Time feels elastic.

Even familiar rooms acquire the faint strangeness of places visited in dreams. Furniture appears slightly displaced from its daytime certainty. Street sounds arrive as fragments rather than narratives. The mind, deprived of external reinforcement, becomes a receptive surface for impressions that would dissolve immediately under daylight scrutiny.

It is not mystical.
Not dangerous.
Not even especially dramatic.

Just thin.

I have had moments there — most of us have — when the boundary between witnessing and participating becomes ambiguous. One moment in particular remains lodged in memory like a quiet shoulder tap. There were real people involved, real conversation, real movement through space. And yet layered within the literal event was something harder to categorize: a presence that did not claim metaphysical authority but nonetheless altered the emotional pressure of the moment.

I cannot narrate specifics. Confidentiality holds the center, and the encounter was not fully mine to claim. But proximity alone can leave residue. Sometimes you do not own the story, yet the story alters you.

Earle’s character inhabits a world of visible stakes — border desperation, economic precarity, the sudden rearrangement of circumstance that forces moral improvisation. His question, What’s a simple man to do?, is less rhetorical than existential. It captures the sound of a human recognizing that the script he believed himself to be following has dissolved without warning.

Franz Wright’s terrain is quieter but no less destabilizing. His encounters are interior, structured around visitations that resist empirical verification yet exert undeniable psychological gravity. Wright’s presence is not law enforcement but the invisible: the sudden sense that one’s life has drifted subtly from its intended trajectory, that something unsummoned has stepped forward and is waiting for acknowledgment.

My hour lived somewhere between those poles.

Not danger.
Not mysticism.
A pressure change.

A moment when the ordinary surface of experience felt slightly displaced by depth — as if an unseen observer had entered the room and paused long enough for recognition without introduction. The encounter unfolded within the grammar of everyday interaction, yet its emotional register belonged to a different frequency.

Here is the calibration, because honesty matters more than narrative ownership:

I turned.

And what I saw was both literal and not literal at all. A person whose presence carried echoes beyond biography. A crossing of emotional currents that felt disproportionate to duration. A moment whose significance resided less in content than in atmosphere.

These encounters are rarely sustained. They appear, register, and dissolve before interpretation can fully assemble. But dissolution does not negate impact. Some experiences operate as quiet rearrangements — subtle shifts in perception that reveal themselves only through later reflection.

You do not leave with answers.
You leave with altered attention.

Music offers a framework for understanding this phenomenon. Covers, reinterpretations, and artistic relays mirror the structure of thin-hour encounters: one experience passing through another consciousness, reshaped without losing origin. Clem Snide’s refracted Wright, Wright’s visitation, Earle’s desperation — each functions as a mediated echo, a reminder that human experience rarely arrives unfiltered.

The encounter at 3 AM belongs to this lineage of mediation. It was not an event demanding explanation but an atmosphere demanding acknowledgment.

Afterward, the memory settles differently from ordinary recollection. It does not assert itself loudly or demand retelling. Instead, it persists as a quiet calibration tool — a reference point that subtly informs later perception. You find yourself recognizing similar atmospheric shifts more quickly, attuned to moments when reality thins and emotional depth approaches the surface.

Such experiences resist mythologizing not because they lack significance but because their significance depends on restraint. To narrate them too fully would distort their nature. They exist precisely in the space between explanation and silence.

You live with them quietly.

Without overclaiming.
Without dramatizing.
Without converting them into personal mythology.
Without pretending you earned, summoned, or deserved their arrival.

They came because certain hours open.

Most do not.

You do not chase these moments. Pursuit transforms them into performance. Instead, you cultivate a form of attention that allows recognition without grasping. When the next thin hour arrives — and it will, though unpredictably — the task is simply to remain receptive enough to notice.

The encounter does not require interpretation.
It requires witness.

And perhaps that is the deeper resonance linking Earle, Wright, and the thin-hour experience itself: each represents a moment when life’s ordinary narrative pauses just long enough to reveal underlying possibility. A reminder that identity is less fixed than assumed, that meaning often arrives indirectly, and that some of the most consequential experiences unfold without external spectacle.

They do not change your life in visible ways.
They change the way your life feels from within.

You return to ordinary routines — morning coffee, daylight conversations, the practicalities of schedule and obligation — carrying an unspoken awareness that certain hours remain portals rather than merely timestamps. The world resumes its solidity, but the memory of porosity lingers.

And so the encounter remains:

not a story,
not a revelation,
not a lesson,
but a quiet rearrangement.

A reminder that sometimes the world steps slightly closer without explanation, offering a glimpse of emotional depth that cannot be captured but can be carried.

You do not chase it.
You do not interpret it.
You do not claim it.

You simply remain awake enough to notice when the hour opens again.

Dedication
For the hour that opened.

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Investigating Action Part I: On Unconferencing

Note: This short reflection began as an observation at professional conferences, where some of the most generative conversations seemed to occur just outside the official program — in hallways, cafés, and improvised gatherings that quietly relocated the center of action. Over time, the idea of the “unconference” grew into something more suggestive: a small window onto how human beings negotiate where meaning, authority, and agency actually reside.

Though the piece does not engage explicitly with Julian Jaynes, readers familiar with his work may detect an affinity. The “unconference” can be read as a micro-site of consciousness in action — a space where participants shift from receiving prescribed structures of engagement to collaboratively generating their own. In that sense, “unconferencing” is less about conferences than about a recurring human impulse: the desire to manufacture intellectual oxygen when the authorized environment feels thin.

This essay remains intentionally provisional. Its aim is not to settle the concept but to open it, inviting readers to notice where unofficial zones of action emerge in their own institutional, professional, and personal lives.

I. Introducing “Unconferencing”

When attending a professional conference these days one may encounter small groups of conference goers congregating in a lobby or coffee shop during the “official” speeches or workshops. When queried, such people may advise you that they are engaged in the “un-conference” (n.) or that they are “un-conferencing” (v.). For the purposes of this piece we shall refer these folks as “un- conferencers” (n.).

Un-conferencing is qualitatively different from when a conferencer slips up to her room for a quick nap or to the pool for a swim. In these cases, the attendee is simply checking out of the conference entirely. They are abdicating any claim to conference action. Un-conferencers, on the other hand, are attempting to establishing a rival zone of conference-related activity. They are, to borrow from Goffman, attempting to shift the locus of the action.

The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, who worked at Cambridge, once advised a colleague to leave the university as there was “no oxygen” to be had there. Upon being asked why then he, Wittgenstein, stayed, the philosopher is said to have replied: “It doesn’t matter…I manufacture my own oxygen.” Inspired by Wittgenstein, we could say that those who involve themselves in unconferences are “manufacturing their own action.”

I suspect that were we to analyze the types of persons who would drop in on an unconference, partake of a loosely specified conference-related activity which exists at a tangent to, or even off the grid of, the main conference, we would find certain similarities in outlook and disposition. I believe we would find people who are, both individually and collectively, attracted to action.

It has been my observation that the large majority of attendees at a conference simply take the conference program at face value. That is, they expect the action to be that which is listed, prescribed, and pre-defined as such. “What’s happening this morning?” “So and so is speaking.” “Great, I’ve been looking forward to this part of the conference since I saw the schedule!” The planned and authorized conference activities are “on stage,” and the audience is invited to partake of the action either passively or through relatively minimal contribution in the form of question and answer or discussion. The locus of action, however, is usually taken as unproblematic, given.

The unconferencer, on the other hand, takes upon him or herself the responsibility, the grave responsibility, of creating and sustaining an alternative set of activities that they purport, though their ironic self-definition, to be action. By issuing an invitation to the unconference, they are in effect saying to the invitee that shifting loyalty from the authorized main activity to the rogue fringe will result in a better, hipper, more effective, enlightening, and action-packed experience.

For the action junkie, the draw of the unconference is unmistakable; the eternal suspicion that the grass is always greener wherever we are not is married to the thrill of involving oneself with an alternate action locus which is cheekily, even brazenly, set up as an overt challenge to the “mass” action that the majority of the junkie’s peers regard as “given.” The very fact that the majority of conference goers are unaware of the existence of the unconference, much less the existential challenge it suggests, makes engagement with this floating, edge-bound, impermanent, and unrecorded body deeply appealing to a certain segment of folks.

While the unconference may appear at first blush to be a relatively minor aspect of an essentially modern and class-specific activity, I would put forth that it actually sheds light on the very essence of how we understand action. The existence of the unconference suggests that action, far from occurring in a single, easily identified, and authorized location, is in fact a floating term subject not only to instantaneous and frequent relocation within a given activity frame but also to subjective definitions particular to individuals with varying temperaments and appetites for both the creation and consumption of action. I believe, in short, that the unconference, modest as it may seem, in fact opens doors to much wider theoretical considerations that may take us back to the very origin of human consciousness.

II. The Unconference and the Inner Voice

If the unconference shifts the locus of action outwardly — from stage to hallway, from keynote to coffee shop — it also performs a quieter relocation within the individual. What changes is not merely where activity occurs, but how participants come to understand their role in producing it. The official conference asks attendees to receive action: to listen, absorb, and occasionally respond within predetermined boundaries. The unconference, by contrast, invites a subtler responsibility — the task of deciding where the action is and, more provocatively, whether it exists at all until one participates in creating it.

This shift is not trivial. For many conference-goers, the program functions as a kind of external voice, an authoritative script that dictates where meaning will unfold and how attention should be allocated. To follow the schedule is to outsource judgment about significance. The unconferencer, however, suspends this outsourcing. In stepping away from the authorized frame, they implicitly claim a right that is both liberating and burdensome: the right to narrate the action for themselves.

What emerges in such spaces is less a rival conference than a laboratory of agency. Conversations drift, topics mutate, and legitimacy is negotiated moment by moment. No one can point to a stage and say, with certainty, this is where it happens.Instead, action becomes a floating construct sustained through collective attention and mutual recognition. The unconference does not replace the official program so much as reveal that the program’s authority was always contingent — dependent on shared belief rather than intrinsic necessity.

This relocation of authority mirrors a broader human pattern. In many domains of life, individuals operate within inherited structures that quietly define where significance resides: classrooms, offices, institutions, rituals. Yet moments arise when these structures feel oxygen-poor, prompting participants to improvise alternative spaces where engagement feels more immediate, more alive. The unconference is one such improvisation, a small but telling instance of how people generate meaning when prescribed channels no longer suffice.

To participate in an unconference, then, is to practice a form of narrative self-authorship. Attendees do not merely attend; they interpret, select, and frame the experience as action. The hallway conversation becomes the keynote because someone decides it is. The coffee shop gathering acquires legitimacy because participants treat it as consequential. Action, in this sense, is less discovered than constructed — an emergent property of attention rather than a fixed feature of the environment.

This does not render official structures irrelevant. Conferences still provide scaffolding, shared reference points, and opportunities for encounter that make unconferencing possible in the first place. But the existence of the unconference suggests that action is never fully captured by authorized spaces. It leaks, migrates, and reconstitutes itself wherever individuals perceive the possibility of meaningful exchange. The unconferencer’s quiet rebellion, therefore, is not against the conference itself but against the assumption that significance must be centrally located and formally sanctioned.

Seen in this light, unconferencing becomes less a quirky professional habit than a microcosm of consciousness in action — a demonstration of how individuals negotiate the tension between external scripts and internal narratives. By manufacturing their own zones of engagement, unconferencers reveal that the question “Where is the action?” is inseparable from the deeper question “Who gets to decide?”

III. Third Places and the Geography of Action

If unconferencing represents a temporary relocation of action within professional space, third places extend this phenomenon into everyday life. Bars, cafés, karaoke rooms, shisha lounges, and hotel lobbies function as informal arenas where meaning and agency are negotiated outside the structures that ostensibly organize our days. These environments rarely announce themselves as sites of significance. They lack stages, programs, and formal hierarchies. Yet participants often experience them as unusually alive — spaces where conversation deepens, identities loosen, and unexpected narratives emerge.

What distinguishes these third places is not their recreational character but their ambiguity. Unlike workplaces or classrooms, they carry no fixed expectations about performance or outcome. This ambiguity produces a subtle psychological freedom: participants are not merely enacting roles but improvising them. In such environments, the question of where the action resides becomes open-ended, contingent upon attention, mood, and relational chemistry rather than institutional design.

The figure of the Thin Man — drifting through cities, bars, and late-night conversations — embodies this geography of floating action. His world is structured less by formal events than by encounters whose significance becomes clear only in retrospect. A casual exchange at a bar may eclipse a planned meeting; a karaoke duet may reveal more about a relationship than hours of scheduled conversation. In these moments, action is not given but discovered through participation, mirroring the unconference’s quiet redefinition of legitimacy.

Third places also highlight the internal dimension of this shift. Just as unconferencers manufacture intellectual oxygen when official conference spaces feel thin, individuals in third places practice a form of narrative authorship. Freed from explicit scripts, they must decide what matters, which conversations to pursue, and how to interpret the unfolding interaction. The authority to define significance moves inward, transforming everyday environments into laboratories of consciousness where meaning is collaboratively constructed rather than externally prescribed.

This dynamic helps explain why third places often feel disproportionately memorable. Their significance is not preauthorized but emergent, generated through a confluence of attention, vulnerability, and improvisation. Participants sense that something unscheduled is occurring, even if its contours remain indistinct at the time. The experience resembles unconferencing at a social scale: an unofficial gathering that quietly competes with, and sometimes surpasses, the legitimacy of structured events.

Yet the relationship between formal and informal spaces remains symbiotic rather than oppositional. Conferences create the conditions for unconferencing; workplaces generate the need for after-work conversations; institutions provide the scaffolding against which third places acquire their freedom. Action migrates across these environments, revealing itself as less a fixed destination than a shifting field sustained through perception and engagement.

In this sense, third places extend the unconference’s insight into a broader philosophy of everyday life. They suggest that action is rarely where it is supposed to be and frequently where no one thought to look. The bar conversation, the karaoke room, the quiet shisha lounge — these spaces operate as unofficial stages where individuals renegotiate identity, intimacy, and understanding. What appears peripheral may, in fact, be central, not because of intrinsic qualities but because participants collectively decide to treat it as such.

The unconferencer and the Thin Man, though inhabiting different settings, share a common impulse: a refusal to accept prescribed boundaries around significance. Both figures navigate environments with an attunement to emergent action, trusting that meaning can be generated wherever attention and curiosity converge. Their movements illustrate a subtle but pervasive truth — that consciousness itself is partly defined by this capacity to relocate action, to manufacture oxygen in spaces where none was promised.

IV. Returning to the Conference

Seen through this wider lens, the unconference no longer appears as a quirky professional habit but as a small instance of a broader human pattern. Conferences, with their schedules and stages, represent one attempt to stabilize action — to locate significance in designated rooms, at designated times, under designated authorities. Such structures are not arbitrary; they provide coherence, shared reference points, and opportunities for encounter that might not otherwise occur. Without them, the unconference itself would lack the context that renders it meaningful.

Yet the existence of the unconference reveals the limits of this stabilization. Action resists containment. It drifts into hallways, cafés, late-night gatherings, and impromptu conversations where participants sense that something more immediate is unfolding. The official program may announce where action is supposed to be, but participants continuously renegotiate this claim through their attention, curiosity, and relational impulses. The conference, in this sense, becomes less a fixed locus of action than a field across which action migrates.

This migration does not invalidate the conference’s authority so much as complicate it. The keynote may still matter; the workshop may still illuminate. But their significance is mediated by a parallel network of informal interactions that shape interpretation, deepen understanding, and generate new connections. The unconference operates within this network as both supplement and critique, reminding participants that legitimacy is not solely conferred by formal designation but also by lived experience.

To notice the unconference is therefore to recognize that action is never singularly located. It is distributed across spaces, moments, and narratives that participants collectively construct. The attendee who slips into a hallway conversation is not abandoning the conference but participating in its expansion, contributing to a decentralized ecology of engagement that cannot be fully captured by the official program. In this ecology, meaning emerges through movement rather than adherence, through improvisation rather than prescription.

What remains, then, is a modest but suggestive insight: the question “Where is the action?” is less empirical than interpretive. Conferences provide one answer, but participants continuously generate others, manufacturing intellectual oxygen wherever they perceive the possibility of meaningful exchange. The unconference embodies this generative impulse, illustrating how individuals negotiate the tension between structured environments and emergent agency without fully resolving it.

In the end, the unconference may be best understood not as a rival conference but as a reminder — a quiet demonstration that action is partly a matter of attention and belief. The stage, the hallway, the coffee shop, and the late-night conversation each become potential centers of significance depending on how participants inhabit them. Conferences, like the broader environments of everyday life, offer frameworks within which action might occur. But the decision to treat any moment as consequential remains, ultimately, a shared and ongoing act of interpretation.

And so the unconference persists, floating at the edges of formal gatherings, manufacturing oxygen where it is needed and relocating action where it feels most alive. Its lesson is neither rebellious nor dismissive but gently subversive: that meaning cannot be fully scheduled, legitimacy cannot be entirely centralized, and the most vital conversations often unfold just beyond the reach of the program.

Provisional Conclusion:

The Unconference endures as a quiet proof that action is never simply where it is announced, but wherever consciousness decides to breathe.

to be continued…

Note: If you like this piece, you may also like this one here on the nature of events.

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On the Phrase “I Got a Guy For That”

Note: Few phrases carry as much quiet social power as “I got a guy for that.” At first glance, it sounds casual, almost throwaway — a shorthand for convenience. Yet beneath the surface, the phrase reveals an entire architecture of trust, reputation, and informal networks that operate parallel to official systems. To have “a guy” is to possess access: access to knowledge, skill, discretion, or opportunity that cannot be easily found through public channels.

The phrase also reflects a deeper human instinct toward relational problem-solving. Rather than relying solely on institutions, we rely on people — plumbers, lawyers, bartenders, mechanics, editors, fixers — individuals whose reliability has been tested through experience and passed along through recommendation. In this sense, “I got a guy” is less about exclusivity than about social capital built over time, a small badge of belonging within overlapping communities.

At its most benign, the phrase signals efficiency and mutual support; at its most ambiguous, it hints at shadow networks, informal economies, and the gray zones where trust replaces regulation. Either way, it captures something fundamental about modern life: solutions are rarely abstract, and almost always relational. The phrase persists because it compresses an entire worldview into five words — a worldview in which problems are solved not by systems alone, but by people who know people.

If you enjoy this piece you might enjoy “The Hired Hand, Part I: Azerbaijan, 1990,” one chapter from my upcoming book The Adventures of the Thin Man and Andrea.

The broker said that he should sell the wine/ they got this guy that can arrange a buy.

Craig Finn

There are different types of marketplaces in the world. First there are legitimate, above-board markets, the shops and such you go to everyday. Then there are black markets, the so-called underground economy. Poised somewhere in between the legitimate and the underground, however, lies another type of market. This is a liminal sort of market, a market for which we need an experienced navigator. This is the realm of “the guy for that.”

We know we are in the realm of this kind of guy whenever we hear someone say “I got a guy for that.” Need a passport in three days? There’s a guy for that. Want to build a greenhouse but don’t want to drop thousands at the home center? There’s a guy for that too. Need to dump some garbage from a construction job but the landfill rates are exorbitant? Go get a guy. Need a prescription but your country doesn’t allow generic pills to cross the border? Another guy. Need to offload your wine cellar to pay the alimony? Craig Finn can find you a guy.

Now the great thing about the guy for that is, although in some cases all the above may be different guys, there are some guys that do it all. This is the type of guy who can get you cut-rate auto parts one day, scalped tickets to the Garden the next, and a little something something for your loft party on the third. Life is divided into specialists and generalists, and here we have the generalist version of the guy for that. Mike Ehrmantraut from the Breaking Bad and Better Call Saul TV series is a classic example of a generalist guy for that.

How does one become a generalist guy for that I wonder? What winding set of life ways leads someone to be able to source whatever you need at short notice? What even are the essential skills of such a guy? I don’t know, but I think the generalist form of the guy for that pops up fairly regularly in the army. Soldiers, whether confined to base or in the field, generally have tightly restricted access to the many pleasures that life can afford. An abundance of rules, meals ready to eat, and a dreary PX may be all they have to work with. That’s where the guy for that comes in. This is the guy who knows when a few ladies are coming through town, down to party. This guy has a line of a van full of meats, has those sweet French cigarettes from across the border. This guy is on top of it. Army fiction is full of these kinds of guys, scamps and scoundrels who are yet always portrayed quite sympathetically by the author. The reason for this is easy to see—if the author has actually been in the army (as a great many nineteenth and mid-twentieth century writers were) he (usually he here) would know and appreciate the many benefits of having a guy for that around, no matter what other undesirable qualities the guy might possess. After all, anyone who hooks you up with quality meats is easily forgiven.

And then there is the specialist guy for that. The specialist guy for that usually possesses a certain rare and highly developed technical skill of some kind. While the generalist guy for that is basically a fixer, good at procuring items and turning them over at a mark up, the specialist guy for that is a technician, an artist even. Here we have the counterfeiter and the stamp forger. The guy who can jailbreak your phone, the safecracker. Here too we have the saboteur, and, of course, the bomb maker. As is easily apparent from this run down, the specialist guy for that tends more toward outright criminality than does the generalist.

There is a great scene in the film The Battle of Algiers where the Algerian rebels who are involved in an insurrection against the French are planning some bombings in the city. They go to a bomb maker, a guy in the back of a dingy shop, naturally, who leisurely and precisely wires the bomb. The scene is entirely wordless, and features close-ups of the bomb maker’s hands as he arms the bomb. The director Steven Soderberg has said that he could watch a whole film about this guy, and I know what he means. He means, I think, that there is a whole world behind the bomb maker guy that could be explored. Who is he? Where does he come from? How did he come to be the go-to-guy for bomb wiring in Algiers in 1961? What does he do in his spare time? We get answers to none of these questions, just a sparely presented introduction to his art. But that’s enough to know for certain that he’s the guy for that.

We will close with a couple of questions. First, what about the gal for that? My theory is that while the gal for that surely exists somewhere, it’s more likely that—proximal to the guy for that—she plays a slightly different role. Shady guys hang with shady gals, no doubt, but the gals tend to occupy another, perhaps larger and certainly less easily definable, place in the proceedings. This is a subject for a future post.

Second, what happens to the guy for that in a future where more of our movements, financial transactions, and even thoughts are tracked and monitored? Will the guy for that slowly go extinct? I don’t think so—at least I hope not. I suspect there will always be a place for the guy for that: the hustler who can see the angles, play the edges, middle the situation before anyone else even knows there is a situation.

All in all, regardless of the relative morality of guy for that activities, I salute him. Also, I gotta go build a greenhouse. I got a guy for that.

Note: If you enjoyed this piece, you may also enjoy another foray into linguistic anthropology “On “Dude” Usage.” You can find that here.

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On the Eventfulness of Pre-Eventified Incidents

Note: Today I’m revisiting a travel vignette about hierarchy, ritual, and the strange ways institutions manufacture “events.” It features a Big Man, a flawless flunky, Jung on surrealist art, and a ceremonial poster board signing that may or may not have meant anything at all. A quiet question lingered long after the ceremony ended. As always, judge for yourself.

If you enjoy this piece, you may enjoy my analysis of the underground rapper and crypto-hacker, Razzlekhan. You can find it here.

Yeah, I met Lou Reed and Patty Smith

It didn’t make me feel different

Conor Oberst

I visited China a number of years ago with a highly ranked member of my university structure and a flunky. My own participation was last-minute as I was filling in for someone else. I guess in a way I was a flunky too. Certainly it was the big man’s show from start to finish.

We visited a number of schools and also met with a business guy who was working very hard to transact with our group something so complex that I never even began to grasp the shape of it despite sitting in multiple meetings around the matter.

The trip was interesting for a number of reasons. The big man barely spoke to me for the first few days despite spending all day together. The schedule was brutal. I was reading Jung On Art on my phone as I was enrolled in on online course I never finished. Jung On Art is great and spends a lot of time on the surrealist painter Yves Tanguy. Finally the big man took a long look at me and said (in Japanese) “you read a lot, don’t you?” I confirmed this, and after that he spoke to me a little more.

The flunky was an archetype of the species. He handled the schedule, made the trains run on time. He did nothing else and deferred to the big man on absolutely every non-schedule related matter. My own strongest contribution to the proceedings was occupying the attention of a friend of the business man during an excruciatingly protracted whisky drinking session so that the business guy and the big man could talk turkey. I am not a great whisky drinker for some reason and making sensible small talk for three or four hours over whisky took a truly heroic effort.

The business guy had a kind of a house in a kind of a hotel, it was hard to say. A full staff was on hand to serve us a full course Chinese meal with white and red wine. This was before the whisky. It was a scene, all the way.

Anyway, all of that is context. I want to write about a specific incident that occurred when we visited one school. The principal who received us knew the big man and we were received by a group of about eight people. We got the school tour. Now, school tours are an occupational hazard in my line of work, and I have trained myself to be a durable recipient. But I don’t really like them. We went through the formalities, which predictably took forever. I daydreamed about Yves Tanguy and bed.

Toward the end of the tour we reached a wall with the school name or emblem on it. Here, the principal paused and asked the big man to write some Chinese characters on some poster board. This was to mark his visit, to consecrate it in a sense. The whole group fanned out into a kind of semi-circle and the big man went through a series of highly performative grimaces to index his deep thought. Or maybe he just didn’t know what to write. I certainly wouldn’t have. Finally he took the pen and with the pomposity of a South American dictator wrote a few characters. The message, to my recollection, was underwhelmingly anodyne. Basic. Or maybe it was gnomic and brilliant. In either case the audience made appropriately awed sounds. I murmured my own supposed appreciation–the role of the acolyte was there to be filled after all. The poster board was then displayed with a flourish on the wall.

At first blush I found the entire episode both deeply interesting and deeply narcissistic. However, the big man was invited to contribute some characters and he did so, so in that sense fair enough. Let’s zoom out a little before rushing to judgment.

You know how some restaurants and bars will have signed pictures of famous people that visited on their walls? Mickey Mantle, Bob Hope, Stallone, whatever. In these cases the visit of the celebrity was an event in the life of the establishment. It merited consecration across time. I understand this. But the big man was not a celebrity in any real sense. He was a university bureaucrat with a taste for acting like a big shot.

But maybe I’m seeing this all wrong. Because there was actually a hint of the classical in the occasion. A host had received an honored guest. The honored guest was asked to bestow words of wisdom and afforded space to do so. The whole performance was approached with apparent complete sincerity by all involved. I was probably the only one not acting in good faith. My feelings at the time were the same as they are now; on the one hand the whole thing was super pompous, on the other hand it had an old-world ceremony that I am not exactly against. An event should be eventful–my little motto–may at times create an unrealistically high bar for situations to rise to. Still, I have a nagging feeling that this visit was not of a sufficiently high caliber or general import to require consecration in kanji.

You know how in the old days a person would take a letter of introduction with them when visiting a new country and would receive an audience on the basis of this kind of letter? That’s probably an almost entirely lost art. When you presented someone with a letter of introduction, as I imagine it, you were then received. Your visit was authorized and elevated into a thing, an event. The eventification of aspects of life is important, even vital, however maybe we are going about the equation backwards. I go to see a lot of live music and at the end of the show the band will often gather at a table to sign merchandise and such. The opportunity to meet the band, if offered, is cool–I’m all behind it. However I myself often skip these lines, even if I love the band. This is because the chance to meet the band and have an experience of doing so is a built-in aspect of the entire evening and therefore pre-eventified so to speak. It’s still cool, but I’m not sure pre-eventified events are best positioned to be eventful. The true event takes place without being pre-planned. The true event emerges and cannot be structured. Most of the time when I see a supposed event transpire, an opening ceremony of some event for example that has been obviously rehearsed, I can barely suppress a yawn. In the immortal words of The Replacements, “color me impressed.”

The epigraph for this piece is from Conor Obrest’s 2016 song “Next of Kin.” It’s a jaded coda to a meeting that we might have supposed would have been eventful, and also a wry recognition that whatever happens to us we are always left with ourselves again. I saw a man sign a poster board. It didn’t make me feel different.

Note: If you enjoyed this piece, you may also enjoy “On the Centrality of the No Helmet Law.” Available below.

On the Centrality of the No Helmet Law

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Keeganisms in the Wild: An Exploration

New Note: I’m republishing Keeganisms for colleagues and friends in the IB world. The piece grew out of my early years in international education, when I was trying to understand not just what we teach, but how adults actually grow, change, and make meaning inside institutions.

Readers interested in my time working at Ritsumeikan Uji and for the IB may also enjoy this piece on great and good talkers, and this one, a tougher piece, on being badly overworked in 2012.

This piece remains one of the clearest statements I’ve written about adult development, leadership, and the limits—and possibilities—of institutional life.

Finally, I am happy to report that the great Stephen Keegan is alive and well. Rock on, sir.

Note: This piece is a re-write of my very first piece of linguistic ethnography. For a fuller explanation of linguistic ethnography check out On “Dude” Usage. A “Keeganism” here is simply a notable phrase used by the former head of the IB Diploma Program for Asia-Pacific Stephen Keegan. Keegan was based out of the Singapore office, which was at the time one of three “hub” offices around the world.

Although fitting in with my other efforts at linguistic ethnography, in this piece I approach Keeganisms as if they are a rare species, like a certain kind of elusive salamander or something. If this little conceit if effective, as it hope it is, this is only because the Keeganisms under investigation are themselves so glorious.

Introduction:

When Stephen Keegan spoke, dozens listened. I was one of them. Darwin sailed around on the Beagle, ran across some turtles in the Galapagos, and his investigation of all that changed the world. While I don’t pretend that my little survey of Keeganisms will change the world, I would not be able to forgive myself if the species was simply lost to time.

Keeganisms were known to flourish between the years 2008-2013, in and around the greater Pacific Rim. Without being able to definitively establish the evolutionary arc of the species, naturalists suspect an increasingly florid progression over the years. For my own part, I was marginally aware of the species in 2008-2009, but did not realize the bounty that Keeganisms provided the scientific community until 2010. What follows is an analysis of some of the most common variants of the species as I was able to observe. All of these instances were found at IB events where Keegan was speaking in public.

Keeganism #1:

Here is Keegen in 2010 describing what the IB provides to its schools in the way of services: “We are not special. I mean, of course we are unique and special in many ways.”

Keegan is making the point that there is a consistency across high quality high school curricula and programs, and that the IB is not somehow in a wholly different category. The first sentence, “we are not special” is a bald statement to this effect. Keegan immediately realizes, however, that this is possibly an infelicitous soundbite, and qualifies with a politician’s cover “I mean, of course we are unique and special in many ways.”

Why is it a Keeganism? The classic form common to the first type of a true Keeganisms can be expressed as (A+D=A>D) where A (Affirmation)=a statement that shows an aspect of Keegan’s actual feelings or opinions about a given matter, and D (Denial)=a qualification which serves to qualify and reduce the sting of the truth-telling in A, but which does not fully counterbalance or neutralize the sentiment of A, thus A>D.

In this case, “I mean, of course we are unique and special in many ways,” gets Keegan off the hook for his heresy, however it is rather obviously a cliched cover (although one does appreciate the “in many ways.”) From a formal point of view, then, this is a classic Keeganism, perhaps the prototype; from a content point of view we can find better.

Keeganism #2:

And we did find better later that year or the next at a meeting of East Asian IB Diploma Coordinators. Here, Keegan is commenting on one of two commercially available software products which were competing for market share for IB schools at that time. “I am not promoting their product. I am promoting the concept of their product (….) They are the future. Of course the future will take many forms.”

In this case Keegan has an opinion about which product if preferable, however in his capacity as an IB employee he cannot state this outright. Instead, he gives an extended tribute to one of the competing companies before making clear that he is “not promoting their product.” Likewise, when he catches himself saying that their product “is the future,” he hastens to make sure we understand that multivalent nature of said future. Thus, he is again “covered.”

“I am not promoting their product. I am promoting the concept of their product” is actually a structural reversal of the classic Keeganism, which reappears in “they are the future. Of course the future will take many forms.” In the first, Keegan’s true opinion comes second, the denial first. Matters are further complicated by the introduction of the word “concept.” While it may be the case that a concept at times can be a free floating entity, in this case Keegan’s semantic distinction is taken, as it is probably intended, with a large measure of salt. Thus again a key feature of the species–the “denial” is consistently underweighted as compared to the affirmation: D+A=D<A.

With Keegan’s statement about the future, the classic structure is back, with a twist. The sentence “of course the future will take many forms” is so nebulous, so frankly metaphysical in its lineaments, that it verges on absurdity. It is also highly arguable, as while it may be true that the characteristics of the future will vary from place to place, it is at least possible to argue that the future will take precisely the form it takes: not a plurality of forms, but exactly one. Of more direct relevance is the point that if the future will take many forms, and in only one of those forms are “they” that future, then why are they “the future” at all? Of course, this is precisely the genius of this particular Keeganism; the “denial” is so slippery that is dissolves almost entirely, assuming instead a purely formal aspect (f). A+D=A(f).

Keeganism #3:

Not all Keeganisms have such an overt affirmation/ denial or denial/ affirmation structure, however. Others slip their denial/ qualification into the body of the affirmation itself. For example: “This alternative is being described as a valid reliable assessment.”

This Keeganism came at an IB conference for the Asian region, Keegan is describing highly contentious changes to the IB Visual Arts curriculum, which at the time the IB was defending against continued protests from art teachers (a fractious bunch when agitated it turns out). An advanced degree in communication theory is not required in order to parse this Keeganism; simply put the addition of “is being described as” shifts the locus of affirmation to some distant body doing the describing and away from Keegan, who is instead stating an unimpeachable fact–somebody somewhere is describing the assessment as reliable. Nonetheless, Keegan is not entirely distancing himself from the affirmation. In fact, there is no counter-affirmation present here, simply a qualification that insulates Keegan from a bald statement of validity and reliability.

Keeganism #4:

Here is Keegan at his final public appearance in Japan before his resignation: “We are delighted to be part of a global organization with global requirements.”

With this one, structurally we are in similar territory, but the valence differs. Keegan is describing some recent “rationalization” of IB services around the world, a change which would reduce some of the autonomy of the Asia Pacific regional office. In fact over the next few years the IB Asia Pacific office, and all of the “hub” offices, would be downgraded from essentially autonomous power centers with a Head of Office of their own to simply branches of the global organization with no clearly assigned leadership of their own. The acute listener will understand that Keegan’s loyalty is more to the region than the global organization; with some justice he feels that Asia-Pacific is the model region. This point has to be borne in mind when approaching this particular Keeganism.

On the face of it this is a fairly simple piece of sarcasm directed at the global infrastructure. However, there are a few complicating factors. First, Keegan uses the plural pronoun–thereby implicating his fellow presenter, and, perhaps, his entire regional office. Of course, the singular here would be far too “on the nose”; still, the “we” puts his colleagues in an interesting position. Second, the repetition of “global” here confers the style we have come to expect from a true Keeganism. Third, there is perhaps more ambiguity here than we might as first suspect. Keegan actually does understand the drive to standardize the regions and the need for global requirements, and he can explain this need in unironic terms. One suspects that an aspect of heart versus head is present here as well. In practice, however, on the communication front lines, Keegan has difficulty standing fully behind the ramifications of certain of these global requirements.

Here is where it gets tricky–the affection with which Keegan was held around the region was in large part a result of his ability to walk a very fine line between representing his employer and representing the region, its Diploma Coordinators, and its Heads of School. In order to sustain this somewhat ambiguous position, Keegan had to be able to ironize, even ridicule, the larger organization. However, were he to cross too far into irony or counter-statements he would risk losing credibility even as he gained affection. Keegan was aware of the bend of this curve, which is why his most overtly heretical affirmations were always immediately qualified. In essence, Keegan was excellent at “triangulating,” and in so doing, it could be argued, simply doing his job.

Keeganism(s) #5:

Then there are a set of statements that fit neither of the above types, but nonetheless qualify as Keeganisms on account of their peculiar word choice/ structure. As the following examples were all taken from a single presentation, one suspects that this category was in fact pretty capacious. Naturalists to this day do not entirely agree as to what counts as a true Keeganism, and there will always be a certain degree of controversy on this point. Here are a couple of examples of these disputed Keeganisms (IB Answers was a kind of help center which would answer stakeholders questions online or by phone):

“Will we be absolutely consistent in absolutely all areas? Absolutely not.”

“IB Answers has provided some answers. They specialize in answers, so it was easy to do.”

First, these enter the realm of possible Keeganisms on account of the repetition of a keyword across sentences. In the first instance, we can imagine the a more normal construction (e.g. a non-Keeganism): “Will we be absolutely consistent in all areas? Probably not.” The meaning here would be similar, however, the addition of the second “absolutely” moves us away from a mere admission of occasional inconsistency to something closer to a statement of purpose. Keegan is not simply stating that inconsistency will occur, he is celebrating it. I believe this to be a Keeganism.

As for the second, one has the suspicion that it may be a standard line, or at least to be making a repeat appearance. A minor area of controversy, of whispered side conversations among modern linguists, is to what extent all Keeganisms are original to their moment. While we have not in fact been able to prove the charge, a line like “they specialize in answers” does raise the antenna of the more conspiratorially minded among us.

Keeganism #6:

Here is Keegan again on IB Answers, which sometimes struggled to get their story straight: “You really have to have more effective answers. It’s a world that really has to be refined.”

The beauty of this Keeganism once again lies in the details. Were we to hear: “You really have to have more effective answers. It’s a process that really has to be refined,” this would account for nothing more than an honest admission of an area of the IB infrastructure that bears improvement. For anyone who knows Keegan, it would be completely unremarkable, as the steps by which an answer is generated through IB Answers are easily imagined as a process. But is IB Answers a “world”? One thinks of Tolkien, of the Wizard of Oz, of the books of Tintin–these are “worlds.” The construction is so odd, so specific, so suggestive of depths and complications unimagined and unimaginable to the listener, that we are swept up in the possibilities, and are once again in the presence of a genuine Keeganism.

Keeganism(s) #7:

“Global PD really has moved in a different way.”

“There is so much happening of a very intriguing nature around the world.”

In this final type of Keeganism we have the apparent qualifier which, under closer examination, turns out to be essentially contentless. After remaking on some recent changes to the IB’s professional development (PD) structure, Keegan’s “global PD really has moved in a different way” is possibly a compliment; however, the use of “different,” instead of any one of a large number of possible alternatives, “better,” “more effective,” “preferable,” etc., so obviously leaves the whole question open that we recognize a stealthy, if minor Keeganism. It is almost as if Keegan, so accustomed to hedging and jousting with language, finds himself here incapable of giving forth a bald, uninflected, statement of praise. From contextual clues we may be able to glean which way Keegan is leaning; on the face of it the sentence could mean absolutely anything.

As for, “there is so much happening of a very intriguing nature around the world,” but of course there is. There is so very much happening that we might almost be tempted to conclude that the future will take many forms.

Dedication: For Steve, thank you for your service.

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On the Shisha Girls and Shisha Boys of Kyoto: Field Observations

Epigraph: Where is my nurse, my nurse with the pills? — Ryan Adams

When the world is too sharp, too fast, too opinionated, I do not go to bars.
I go underground.

Down the low-lit stairs in Gion — where tourists drift past overhead and never notice the door — there is a basement shisha den that looks closed even when it isn’t. Noon to 3:00 a.m. daily, 5:00 a.m. on weekends. A place you would miss unless you were meant to find it. Shoes off at the threshold. Warm air, low music, no urgency of any kind. Just couches — three of them — a handful of curtained recesses where people lie fully horizontal like monks or patients or dreamers, and a second floor with several cubbies up steep wooden stairs.

I take a couch, the one I always take — long enough to fully stretch out. Because I am a serious regular, the staff will bump me ahead of others in line to make sure I get my couch. I never asked for this privilege; the staff simply decided on my behalf.

Shisha here is not an accessory; it is the medium. A cappuccino-cinnamon-berry bowl — number four, Turkish — smooth draw, no burn, warmed through cassis if I want the smoke heavier on the lungs. One gin and tonic, maybe two over the course of a session and a glass of water. After thirty minutes, I’m steady. After two hours, I am gone — dissolved but aware, body slow, mind open like a lens on long exposure. Six hours is half a day and feels like two minutes.

This is how I work. I write here. I talk on the phone here. Parallel processing is possible here in a way the world never allows — one half of the brain in conversation, the other spilling sentences into the phone notes without friction. Time softens. Thoughts move without edges. I do not come here to escape the world. I come here to metabolize it.

And always — there are Shisha Girls, and occasionally Shisha Boys.

The girls are not bartenders. They are not hostesses. They are ritual nurses, the so-called nurse with the goods.

The first one I met — call her B. — recognized me early as a serious regular. Light build, hair tied back, barefoot, comfortable like someone who lives inside her own body without apology. She bends into the couch alcove, refills the charcoal, and takes two or three tester pulls through the mouthpiece she wears on a lanyard. That detail matters: they share your bowl to tend it properly. Their breath meets your breath. Their lungs judge the temperature. They diagnose by inhalation.

No plastic tips if you don’t want them — the gold mouthpiece direct to mouth, warm, personal, intimate in the way only unspoken trust is intimate.

K. is older — early thirties — and the one who opens at precisely noon. I give her three or four minutes to descend the stairs and switch on the lights. She’s the quiet boss, not by authority, but by ritual competence. She alone recommended berry + cinnamon when I asked for something special. She knows my bowl, my drink, my couch, my tempo. When she works, I settle in with the confidence of someone returning to a familiar bed in a hotel room booked under a different name.

There are Shisha Boys too. One rotates charcoal with the same practiced inhalation, hair slicked back, present but not overly personal. Another is stationed at the front like soft-security — staff-adjacent — always smoking, rarely speaking, cashing out customers with a nod. They do not socialize. They do not pitch stories. They do not extract biography. You might visit for years and never know their names, and this is deliberate.

In bars, the first currency traded is information: What’s your name? Where are you from?What do you do? Identity is the entry ticket; personality is the product.

But shisha does not trade identity. Shisha trades nervous systems.

You don’t bond through story —you bond through shared respiration.

The intimacy is somatic, not verbal. They watch breath, not face. They regulate heat, not conversation. They calibrate you the way a nurse adjusts an IV — quietly, competently, without inserting themselves. Bars escalate. Shisha deepens. Bars push energy outward. Shisha draws it inward like a tide at night. In bars, you hold yourself up. In Shisha, the room holds you.

After three or six hours, only one thing pulls me back to the surface — nicotine. Shisha gives without demanding, but you are not allowed to smoke a cigarette. A single drawback. So I rise, shoes on, payment made, nod to K. or B. or whichever quiet caretaker tended the bowl. I climb the dim stairs and push into daylight or dark, immediately searching for a legal ashtray on the street.

The re-entry cigarette is the punctuation mark. Shisha is the sentence.

Why do I go? Because here I can chill, dissolve, write, speak, breathe. Because every part of the ritual feels earned — the bowl, the gin, the charcoal refreshes taken communally through their own mouthpieces. Because I belong here in a way that requires nothing.

They are not my friends. They are not therapists. They are not bartenders.

They are my extended other family of lungs and smoke, a household without biography, without narrative — only breath.

Dedication: For B. and K., sneaky babes both of them.